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RIGHT OF NATURAL PARENTS TO NOTICE IN
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
RICHARD C. MAXWELL *
T HE statutes of North Dakota provide that "The natural
parents of an adopted child shall be deprived by the decree
of adoption of all legal rights respecting the child ...... 1 This
paper is concerned with the question of how far adoption pro-
cedures must provide an opportunity for the natural parents
to oppose this deprivation of their rights of parenthood. If
there is a social advantage in preserving the anonymity of
the adoptive parents in relation to the natural parents, can
this advantage be validly gained by previous consent and
waiver of notice of the adoption proceedings by the natural
parents?
Although a decree of adoption involves changes of status, the
rule that the state of the domicile of the parties has exclusive
control over such changes has not been given full application.
The fact that either the adopting parent or the adoptive child
is a domiciliary has been held sufficient to give the courts of
a state jurisdiction to decree a valid adoption. 2 Assuming that
such a jurisdictional basis exists, our inquiry will concern it-
self with the futher steps that must be taken to render the
decree of adoption immune from future collateral attack by
the natural parents.
It is usual for adoption statutes to provide that an adoption
cannot be effected without the consent of the natural parents
of the child.3 Most states, however, have provided exceptions to
this rule, as North Dakota has in the case of "a parent who has
abandoned the child, or who cannot be found, or who is insane
or otherwise incapable of giving consent, or who has lost
custody of the child through divorce proceedings or the order
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 14-1114.
2 Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N. E. 349, 97 Am. St. Rep. 441 (1903);
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 142 (2d ed. 1938) ; for criticism of this policy,
see Newbold, Jurisdictional and Social Aspects of Adoption, 11 Minn. L. Rev.
605,608. It seems doubtful that Sec. 14-1108 of the N. D. Code, which provides
for petitions to adopt by "Any person.. .in the county in which he is a resi-
dent ... ," was meant to be jurisdictional. Cf. Schillerstrom v. Schillerstrom, 32
N. W. 2d 106 (N. D. 1948).
3 4 Vernier, American Family Laws 340 (1936).
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of a juvenile court .... " It is in the application of these ex-
ceptions that most problems of notice have arisen.
A good starting point in an analysis of the cases in which
natural parents have successfully attacked adoption decrees
is Schiltz v. Roenitz.6 In that action by a father to recover the
value of the services of a minor daughter, the defendant inter-
posed a decree of adoption of the child as a' defense. It appeared
that the adoption proceedings recited the abandonment of the
child by the father and the fact that the mother was dead, but
there was nothing to show that the father was ever given notice
of the hearing on the petition to adopt. In reversing a judg-
ment for the defendant in the lower court, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin held that the decree of adoption was a nullity
as to the father, since its attempt to deprive him "without
notice.., of his most sacred natural rights in respect to his
child" was a violation of the due process of law guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.6 The application of the reasoning in the Schiltz Case to
statutes obviating the necessity of consent by the natural
parents to adoption where they have abandoned the child'
results in the requirement that the fact of abandonment be
judicially determined with such notice to the natural parents
as will satisfy the requirements of due process.
7
Suppose, however, that the natural parent has had his day
in court on the question of the right to custody of the child,
and that he has been deprived of that right by a judicial decree.
Does due process require that he be given notice of a proceed-
ing for the adoption of the child commenced after such a
decree is rendered? Custody decrees awarded in the course of
divorce litigation have given rise to most of the decisions on
this point. Although the North Dakota statutes specifically
provide that the consent of the parent deprived of custody is
not necessary to the valid adoption of the child in such a
4 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 14-1114.
5 86 Wis. 31, 56 N. W. 194, 39 Am. St. Rep. 873 (1893).
6 If a decree of adoption is invalid on a constitutional ground, the validity
of section 14-1112 of the N. D. Code, limiting attack to one year from the
entry of the decree; seems questionable.
7 Sullivan v. People, 224 Ill. 468, 79 N. E. 695 (1906); Lacher v. Venus,
177 Wis. 558, 188 N. W. 613 (1922); In re Davis' Adoption, 142 Misc. 681, 255
N. Y. S. 416 (1932); see In re Sulewski, 113 Pa. Super. 301, 173 At. 747 (1934) ;
Notes, 24 A. L. R. 403 (1922); 76 A. L. R. 1077 (1932). Section 14-1110 indicates
that the court may direct service by publication; see Rockford v. Bailey, 322 Mo.
1155, 17 S. W. 2d 941 (1929).
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situation," they also provide that notice of the hearing on the
petition for adoption shall be given to such a parent.9 It has
been successfully maintained that such notice is not necessary.
In In re Beers,10 where a divorced father was attacking a
decree of adoption consented to by his divorced wife to whom
custody had been awarded, the court sustained the validity
of the decree, being of the opinion that the estranged father
"did have his day in court in the divorce case, wherein it was
adjudged that his wife was the proper person to have the care
and custody of the child .... " The attempt of a divorced
mother to get a modification of the custody decree rendered
in a divorce action was met in In re Hardesty's Adoption 1
with a decree of adoption made with the consent of the divorced
father without notice to the mother. The court found that
"The adoption having been regularly made, the status of the
child was changed, it was no longer the child of its natural par-
ents .... " There is nothing to indicate that the courts of these
jurisdictions were without the power to exercise a discretion
similar to that which has been conferred on the North Dakota
,courts to modify awards of custody as they deem proper. 12 The
error in the finality which is in effect given by these decisions
to an award of custody is made evident by another line of
cases. The parent to whom custody had been awarded in
In re De Leon 13 died, and adoption proceedings were instituted
without notice to the surviving parent. The court upheld an
order vacating the decree of adoption on the petition of the
living parent, recognizing that under the statutes of California,
which do not differ substantially from those involved in other
cases considered in this paper, "so long as the child ... con-
tinues to be a minor, there is no such thing as a final order
pertaining to the custody of such child." Recent cases have
recognized that a custody award does not destroy the parental
relationship and that the parent who is deprived of the child
retains at least the possibility of resuming parental control
in the future; and that, therefore, the judicial determination of
custody as incident to a divorce action does not supply the
8 See note 4 supra.
9 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 14-1110.
10 78 Wash. 576, 139 Pac. 629 (1914).
11 150 Kan. 271, 92 P. 2d 49 (1914).
12 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 14-0522; Compare Kan. Gen. Stat. (1935)
Sec. 60-1510.
13 70 Cal. App. 1, 232 Pac. 738 (1925).
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judicial hearing to which the parent is entitled before his
parental status can be legally destroyed. 14 Regardless of
whether or not the consent of the parent who has been deprived
of custody is required for a valid adoption, 15 it seems that a
proper analysis discloses rights in such a parent which cannot
be finally cut off without notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 18 This principle was clearly applied by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in Nelson v. Ecklund,1 where an
allegedly insane father was given no notice of proceedings
to adopt his minor daughter. In declaring the resulting adop-
tion decree void as to the father, the Court stated: "Confusion
appears to arise from failure to distinguish between the con-
sent of the insane person and notice of proceedings to be given
to him .... While the consent of the father may not have been
necessary, nevertheless he was entitled to notice of the pro-
ceedings ... adoption proceedings are judicial in their nature
and there can be no judicial hearing of any kind without notice
to the parties affected."
The principles thus far evolved must be examined in rela-
tion to yet another situation to determine the answer to the
question posed at the beginning of this paper. That situation,
in which an unwed mother surrenders her child for adoption
soon after its birth, is perhaps the commonest setting for
adoption proceedings. Our object is to construct a procedure
which will preserve the privacy of both the adoptive parents
and the natural mother and yet safeguard the adoption decree
from collateral attack by recognizing the constitutional rights
of the natural parent.1 8 The obvious practical solution is to
have the natural mother consent in advance to the adoption of
the child, leaving the custody of the child and the handling of
the adoption to a public welfare institution. Although there
are cases indicating that the mere signing of a statement by
14 Rubendall v. Bisterfelt, 227 Iowa 1388, 291 N. W. 401 (1940); Stone'v.
Dickerson, 138 S. W. 2d 200 (Civ. App. Tex. 1940); Grider v. Grider, 182 Tenn.
406, 187 S. W. 2d 613 (1945); cf. Smith v. Smith, 180 P. 2d 853 (1947).
15 See Note, 91 A. L. R. 1387 (1934).
16 The fact that an adoption decree is held invalid as to a parent who has
not had notice does not, of course, mean that the parent will be entitled to
custody as against the alleged adoptive parents. Fielding v. Highsmith, 152
Fla. 837, 13 So. 2d 208 (1943), "the moral, intellectual and material welfare
of the child are the matters of chief importance..."; See Note, Consent in
Adoption in Iowa, 33 Iowa L. Rev. 678 (1948).
17 68 N. D. 724, 283 N. W. 273 (1938).
18 The writer realizes that there are human values which will not be safe-
guarded by a mere rdcognition of constitutional rights. This discussion is limited,
however, to a consideration of legal soundness only.
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the mother giving up her rights to the child is sufficient to
negative the necessity of notice of the adoption proceedings
being given to her,19 this is hardly a sound basis on which to
permit the adoptive parents to build their new family. One
difficulty that can arise out of such a situation is the necessity
of determining whether the consent has been withdrawn before
the adoption is completed. Although, as a recent case stated,
the efficacy of such withdrawal might be subject to "well
established principles of contract, waiver, and equitable
estoppel ...., "20 the obvious need of a judicial determination
of these issues would seem to call for notice of the adoption
proceedings to finally determine the rights of the natural
mother. In Adoption of Capparelli,21 written consent was with-
drawn and the natural mother became an intervenor at the
adoption hearing on that issue, successfully defeating the
petition to adopt. If the mother had not been a party to the
adoption proceeding, would not her rights have persisted for
use in a later collateral attack?
It has been noted that one of the situations where the con-
sent of the natural parents is not required in North Dakota is
where custody of the child has been lost through "the order
of the juvenile court .... ,2 22 Our statutes do not specifically
require notice to the natural parents in such a situation at
the time of the adoption proceedings, but do provide for notice
to "a parent who has lost custody of the child through divorce
proceedings ... ."23 If the juvenile court has exercised its
power because the parents' home is "an unfit place for such
child to live..., " 24 this distinction does not seem justified.
Deprivation of custody for social welfare reasons seems no
more conclusive of the parents rights as to the child than the
custody decree in the divorce action, and the permanent
change of status envisaged by subsequent adoption proceed-
ings must be accomplished with notice.22 However, another
19 See In re Rising, 104 Wash. 581, 177 Pac. 351 (1919) ; In re Foster, 209 N. C.
489, 183 S. E. 744 (1936).
20 See In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644, 648 (App. D. C. 1944).
21 175 P. 2d 153 (Ore. 1946).
22 See note 4 supra.
23 See note 8 supra.
24 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 27-1608 (1).
25 In re Whetstone, 137 Fla. 712, 188 So. 576 (1939), "notice of and partici-
pation in commitment proceedings ... cannot be substituted for... notice of
subsequent proposed adoption proceedings."; cf. Ex Parte Parker, 195 Okl. 224,
156 P. 2d 584.
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basis on which a successful elimination of such notice might
be founded is suggested by the abandonment cases. It seems
clear that a judicial determination of abandonment with notice
could be followed by an adoption valid without notice to the
abandoning parent.2 6 Once the fact of abandonment has been
determined in a proceeding in which the natural parent has
had an opportunity to be heard, the requirements of due pro-
cess appear to have been met. In the event that the natural
parent appears in the proceeding to adjudge abandonment and
denies the fact, claiming the child, a different result would
seem to follow. It would be difficult for the court in such a
situation to decree the present existence of a state of abandon-
ment, but a deprivation of custody might be ordered if war-
ranted by a record of previous neglect. Our analysis would
require that in such a case notice be given of the commence-
ment of. a subsequent adoption proceeding. If, however, the
decree of abandonment is entered with notice but without
opposition, the abandoning parent is placed in such a position
that in the absence of an intervening judicial proceeding, such
as habeas corpus by the parent to obtain custody of the child,
his dormant rights can be cut off without notice. This is not
because the decree of abandonment finally changes the status
of the child, destroying the parental rights. The decree does
not have this effect. An attempt by habeas corpus to regain the
child's custody, even though unsuccessful, would activate the
parental rights to the extent that they could not be destroyed
without notice; but the decree of abandonment, standing
alone, would furnish an adequate legal basis on which to found
an adoption decree rendered without further notice to the
natural parents. Suppose, then, that an unwed mother peti-
tions the juvenile court for an adjudication relieving her of
her parental responsibilities and depriving her of her parental
rights, and that she consents before the court to the child
being placed for adoption. Is this proceeding analogous to
an adjudication of abandonment or to a mere judicial depriva-
tion of custody? It seems clear, though the word is harsh in
this application, that the mother's acts amount to a legalized
abandonment. The decree entered in this proceeding, like the
decree of abandonment, does not completely cut off the moth-
26 See State ex rel. -Thompson v. District Court, 75 Mont. 147; 242 Pac. 959
(1926); cf. People v. Feser, 195 App. Div. 90, 186 N. Y. S. 443 (1921); People
v. Pickle, 213 N. Y. S. 70, 215 App. Div. 38 (1925). See text to note 6 supra.
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er's rights as to the child; but unlike a mere deprivation of
custody, such rights as the mother retains must, to survive,
be asserted before the entry of an adoption decree. Adoption
proceedings can be instituted without further notice to the
natural mother,27 and the decree entered under such circum-
stances seems secure from successful collateral attack by her.
Although such a procedure seems to adequately protect the
legal rights of the natural. parent, the protection of the human
rights involved is dependent on more complicated factors than
the analysis of case law. It would seem, however, that such a
proceeding, before a judge fully cognizant of his responsi-
bilities to all concerned, would have real value, beyond legal
necessity, in assuring that the natural mother is reaching a
properly considered decision in giving up her child.
27 As to the rights of the natural father of an illegitimate child, see Gibson,
Appellant, 154 Mass. 378 (1891) (notice not necessary); In re Adoption of a
Minor, 155 F. 2d 870 (1946) (notice required under statute).
